The Virginian-Pilot
©
The May fire aboard the carrier George Washington that injured 37 sailors, caused $70 million in damage and delayed the ship's forward deployment to Japan was "entirely preventable," according to the Pacific Fleet Commander in a final report made public Friday.
Adm. Robert Willard faulted the ship's leadership for improperly handling the conditions that led to the fire. And he blamed inadequate firefighting training for the amount of time it took to locate and extinguish the fire.
Willard also aimed higher and questioned naval leaders in Hawaii, San Diego and Norfolk about "possible shortcomings" while the ship was undergoing training and about deficiencies that "appear to be systemic and may call for an overhaul" of carrier manning and training processes.
The George Washington left Norfolk for its new home port in Yokosuka, Japan, in April. On May 22, a fire began in one of the carrier's unmanned auxiliary boiler exhaust and supply uptake spaces. The blaze grew quickly, fed by large amounts of improperly stored hazardous materials.
It took the ship's leaders nearly eight hours to track down the source of the blaze, by which time the fire had spread across eight stories. Near its origin, the fire caused significant damage to the ship's structure, equipment and electrical cabling.
The crew fought the fire for 12 hours. Had it not been for training and equipment shortfalls, Willard wrote, the damage could have been much less.
The blaze was blamed on unauthorized smoking near flammable refrigerant oil that shouldn't have been there.
The ship's chief engineer had previously noticed the 300 gallons of oil, ordered its disposal and told his superiors, including the ship's executive officer, of the find, according to the report. Ninety gallons of the oil was improperly placed in the uptake space where the fire started and, the report continued, "senior leadership had allowed shipboard inspection processes to lapse to a point that HAZMAT could be improperly stowed within the ship with little likelihood of discovery."
The ship's commanding officer, Capt. David Dykhoff, and its executive officer, Capt. David Dober, were replaced. The report also recommended administrative and disciplinary actions for an additional two dozen officers and enlisted sailors in the ship's HAZMAT, engineering and firefighting units.
The ship was diverted to San Diego for three months of repairs before continuing to Japan in late August to replace the carrier Kitty Hawk, which is to be decommissioned.
On a broader scale, the report called for a review of the entire carrier certification process and recommended that Fleet Forces, Naval Air Forces and Pacific Fleet commands increase outside inspections and demand more direct oversight from their type and strike group commanders regarding ship performance measures.
Matthew Jones, (757) 446-2949, matthew.jones@pilotonline.com
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leader ship
I agree with all the post and also feel the new navy's leadership is failing i remeber when stationed at great lakes as a company commander things started to fail when the chaplins started telling the recruits that the cc could not scream at them or take many corrective measures and one could see the results when training results started declining and like the i beleive chief in charge of the repain locker got taken aside and lectured for getting on the e 5's case for not knowing what the equiptment in the locke looked like and in th elocal san diego paper they said this morning that none of the officer's received and administrative disicipline but some of the enlisted did think they need to take action all the way up the lader since a lot of th eofficers won't listen to the chiefs etc. and spent 20 years in dederal fire department and think it would be rather hard to start this oil by smoking in the area unless they started some other combustible materials
Second Investigation Report Better!
Glad to see that this investigation revealed that there were more responsible down the chain of command vs. pinning it all on the CO & XO!
This incident also underscores the dangers of improperly storing HAZMAT and the need for a stronger Consolidated Hazardous Material
Reutilization and Inventory Management Program and for it to be taken seriously! Since the shipboard CHRIMP is typically accepted as an onboard stepchild, consider moving the CHRIMP under engineering? Besides, they are the biggest users of HAZMAT next to the Deck Dept. Go figure, and they may even be better at managing the shelf life of the HAZMAT! You see..., most departments want to hord their own HAZMAT, but it's supposed to be controlled by the supply dept! Also, Navy should consider a more aggressive HAZMAT NEC under supply dept. to track this stuff! Can't speak to the firefighting, but 12 hrs?
Prime example.
This was the last straw for me:
An E-5 (RM2) ESWS (enlisted surface warfare specialist) was assigned to my repair locker. During a fire drill I was assigned to monitor comms and stage everthing to the scene as needed. I asked said petty officer to get the oxygen analyzer and take it to the scene, "You gonna haf ta show me what it is" Was the responce. I replied "you got to be kidding me you are an E-5 ESWS and do not know what the oxygen analyzer is or looks like". Needless to say I was given a talking to later in the day for my insensitivity and treatment of said ESWS E-5.
As an E-3 in 1979-80 I had to ID everything in the repair locker and explain and demonstrate how to operate it in order for my quals to be signed. This was done within 90 days of repoting aboard or no liberty until completed.
Bring back the "MILITARY"
THE RESULT OF MISPLACED PRIORITIES
You folks have hit the nail on the head. This is what happens when the Navy worries more about diversity than discipline, more about social equality than getting the job done. It's what happens when two dozen of the crew are pregnant instead of doing their jobs, and when sailors are shacking up instead of training. It's what happens when the CO has to worry more about pushing paper than making sure his ship is ready for sea.
Thomasjay
That is so true! I was on the GW for over 2 years and when we went out to sea there were tons of GQ's, which is also why I can't figure out why it took them so long to find the fire. We had 2 to 3 GQ's a week. But there are so many people TAD to so many different areas that it does make it difficult to be manned in every shop. If this HAZMAT was found during a zone inspection why wasn't it moved right away? When I was in, zone inspections meant you had to fix it now and fix it right. I am just glad I got out before that ship went to Japan because I know that crew went through something bad and now they will all get puncished whther the Pilot knows it or not.
Thomasjaysr spot on!
Thomasjaysr nailed it exactly for what it is: a senior leadership created management nightmare. Thank god i just retired.
Touchy feely, PC, quota meeting Navy!
Who's to blame? Kind of hard to accomplish anything when people are promoted for what they are not what they know. Having to worry about the consequences from telling someone to do something because you might be picking on them hurts also. Until the military is restored to being the "military" and not some socialist quota filled equality utopia experiment these issues will continue and our military's personnel quality will continue to decline.
Leadership lacking
Only changes will happen when leadership replaces the social service environment the navy's. When Command Master Chief actually leads, give advice to the Commanding Officer vice babysitting and cheer leading. When Chief Petty Officer's get out of the mess and college books and get back on the deck plates. Last when they actually write honest evals and fitreps. Not every Officer, Chief or Petty Officer walks on water. If they did the navy would not have all those problems. until then keep plugging away on that new PT outfit.
Thomasjayer...
That was well put, and true.
Not to mention the idiot that was smoking down there. Let's not forget him/her.
Sure it was preventable but who is really to blame?
The HAZMAT wasn’t a secret; CHENG reported it to the XO and ordered removal. Why it wasn’t removed is beyond me, but I’d guess it was because it was obe, sweepers, clean the ship, working party, mando training, duty section muster, d/s watch, dept watch, safety stand-down, urinalysis, berthing cleaners, medical/dental hit list, zone inspection, WCS, LCPO, DIVO, PA, DH, Elite, 3MC, XO, CO PMS spot checks, MDS inputs, data calls, re-ordering canceled supplies, supply pick-up, GQ, standing watch, collateral duties, career counseling, PRT obligations, actual maintenance, troubleshooting a casualty. Then the detailer tells you that you can get by with 80% manning because that’s just the way it is, and X number of your personnel are TAD to Security, X number are TAD to the Mess Decks, and X number on an IA. Who's to blame?