The Virginian-Pilot
©
NORFOLK
Navy Lt. Cmdr. Sean Kearns' court-martial on a charge of negligence in his duties as executive officer of the ship San Antonio began Monday - but he's not the only one on trial.
The proceeding - related to the death of a sailor during a deployment last year - could give the already bruised San Antonio ship program yet another black eye.
Prosecutors contend that Kearns did not ensure effective training or supervision of small boat operations on Feb. 4, 2009, when the amphibious transport dock ship - the first in its class - was operating in the Gulf of Aden.
That morning, an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat with three sailors aboard was lowered to the water. Its engines failed to start, and it flipped over soon after hitting the water. Two sailors were rescued. Petty Officer 1st Class Theophilus Ansong, the small boat 's engineer, apparently drowned. His life vest, too large for his frame and improperly closed, was recovered; his body was never found.
Coast Guard Lt. Jonathan Burby, the assistant prosecutor in the case, told the six-member jury that the case is "about the challenges of operating a ship at sea" and the expectations of leaders who choose to take up the responsibilities of command.
He promised a "mental snapshot" of what was going on aboard that morning.
Kearns, whose duties as second-in-command included supervising small-boat operations, was not on the bridge for the launch of Ansong's rigid-hull inflatable boat, Burby said. Instead, he was in his stateroom, checking e-mail.
The assistant defense counsel, Lt. Cmdr. Chris Czaplak, painted a different scene during opening arguments.
"You probably want to know the rest of the story," he told the jurors, who are all commanders or captains. That mental snapshot, he insisted, requires a leap of logic. How else to explain that an apparent mistake from a qualified enlisted sailor standing watch turned into the court-martial of the executive officer?
He also explained that Kearns was extremely busy that day and wasn't sending personal messages in his stateroom that morning. He was checking messages related to the scheduled transfer of 100 Marine passengers to another Navy vessel, the disembarking of an admiral and task force staff from the ship, and the operations of the San Antonio's helicopter and two small boats.
Then Czaplak delved into what looks to be the heart of the case. "You're going to learn a lot about the San Antonio, but I think I can sum it up," he said, quoting from a 2007 internal Navy report that it remained "an unfinished ship."
"She was incomplete," Czaplak said. "The Navy wanted Kearns and the crew to deploy with an incomplete ship. Now, it wants to court-martial him."
The lawyer described some well-known problems found on the San Antonio: 6,000 faulty welds, and loose bolts that caused the engines to misalign. He also revealed that it deployed without 40 percent of the technical manuals usually found on board.
"The evidence is going to show that the government is grasping at straws, hoping you'll see a haystack," he said. "They're not even going to come close to their burden" of proof.
Kearns faces a single charge of negligence, which carries a maximum sentence of three months confinement and forfeiture of pay.
The first to testify of an expected two dozen witnesses was Chief Warrant Officer Luis Rodriguez, who oversees all small-boat operations on the Mesa Verde, a newer version of the San Antonio.
He walked the jury through the typical operation of lowering a rigid-hull inflatable boat into the water.
Using 17 photos, he gave highly technical explanations of the process, which varies significantly from procedures on older ships.
When he finished, lead defense attorney Lt. Drew Carmichael asked Rodriguez a follow-up question: Where can the written guidelines for small-boat operations on San Antonio-class ships be found?
"There's not one," Rodriguez testified. It's something that's currently being worked on.
Have you ever seen any written procedures for lowering small boats into the water from a San Antonio-class ship, Carmichael asked.
"I just wrote the procedures for my ship, and sent them out to folks compiling the information, so they can come up with a final way of doing this," Rodriguez said.
Kearns' trial resumes today and is expected to last all week. Among the anticipated witnesses is Cmdr. Eric Cash, the ship's former commanding officer, who was reprimanded but not relieved of command for similar reasons: failing to ensure supervision of small-boat operations the day Ansong died.
Kearns refused the option of facing non-judicial punishment in an administrative hearing. Instead, he opted to have a jury decide his fate.
Kate Wiltrout, (757) 446-2629, kate.wiltrout@pilotonline.com
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Is everyone being looked at?
Where are the Admirals that made the decision to allow this ship to be deployed? Are they going to stand up and take responsibility for the decisions that they made? That ship would never have been in this situation if the appropriate individuals who make those types of decisions did the right thing!
training
I spent allot of time being sent to mess duty, Compartment cleaning, Master at arms. I didn't see any training in any of it. You just do a job, the best you can. I think you have to train yourself.
My
husband was in the Navy for 24 years. During that time, he knew how to operate and maintain the equipment he was assigned to. He has since retired and discovered that personnel on board these ships are clueless as to how to work them. Why is that? Why does a retiree have to come on board to give training that the Navy gave him in the '80's but now no one knows how to take care of their ship. I have asked him many times, "What happens if they're in the middle of the Atlantic and their ship breaks?" his response "They'll send us or the shipyard out to fix it". Next question--Why is the XO responsible for some dimwit that didn't know how to properly secure a life jacket? Did they not have senior enlisted in charge of this operation? And, finally, why did the Navy accept the ship when it failed it's sea trials 3 times? I say the XO was very smart to ask for a trial---maybe the military will snap to and start acting like a "trained force". Maybe, too, the Navy will quit not only spending our money on these lemons but giving BONUSES to the builders!
Navy Training
As a retired sailor who retired in 2002 I and most sailors that enlisted around the time I did 1982 will say that a emphasis on self training aboard the ship is a failure. Training is conducted by onboard training teams vice going to GTMO for what seemed like an eternity. As much as we hated GTMO and the thought of failing the final battle problem and missing out on going home. Ships were better trained and more ready for what the future held. Like a previous poster said until the navy rebuilds outside training teams I think these type of accidents will continue to happen.
back in the day...
In 1979, the Captain of the USS Canisteo refused to certify that his ship was seaworthy on the grounds that his sailors were untrained.
In present day, all officers are just looking to punch the necessary tickets for command and promotion. Obviously, the CO of San Antonio felt that getting his "command while deployed ticket" punched with an untrained crew was more important than safety of his personnel. That the XO likewise went along for the ride, he bears some culpability here.
Although I don't like to blame victims, I do agree with the commenter who said the victim shares some measure of responsibility in that he undertook this evolution without properly donning his safety equipment.
Still, these amphibs have a welldeck and a stern gate. Why can't ALL small boat operations be undertaken through the stern? Oh yes, I forgot, CIVILIANS design these ships...SAILORS just have to suffer...
Well Deck Ops
Having served on an earlier class of LPD (and it's obvious you haven't), the amount of time necessary to ballast down to launch from the well is significant. Even if ballasted "to the sill" with the upper gate open and the lower gate "cracked," it is still a measurable time to launch.
Not to mention that well deck craft (LCM's and LCUs) are large, slow, and have flat bottoms which do not make them suitable for rescue, boarding, or other operations that require speed and agility.
Davit-mounted boats are designed to be launched quickly, and in more significant sea conditions than what would make well deck operations extremely hazardous.
This tragedy was caused by a number of factors, and IMHO, the XO, while responsible (along with the CO), should not be found guilty of dereliction. With all the problems in the San Antonio, my guess is that there were MANY other (material-related) problems that contributed.
Scapegoat
This is nothing more than an opportunity to pin the blame on one man as opposed to looking at the big picture. Here is the big picture for those of you who don't see it. We pushed millions of dollars into an unfinished project and put it into service. We expect those Sailors assigned to finish what a large corporation was paid millions to complete.(For a minute fraction of what they should be paid). Hold an entire crew responsible for generating operating instructions for something they themselves had no hand in developing. When things go south for a crew that is doing the best job they can (or better yet...guessing what they are supposed to be doing) and blame them for it when in truth, the responsibility and fault should lie with the shipyard who built this ship. Or maybe we should take a look at the construction contract and see IF operating instructions for these shipboard systems were included in the contract, and if not........ Hold the company or individuals responsible for drafting and approving the contract responsible for this shortfall... The military is so concerned with screwing over their own and blaming them for situations the military themselves put them in so as to
Scapegoat (Cont)
not have to pay the large sum of money to get to the root of the REAL problem. It is much less expensive to destroy one of your own then to spend the tens of thousands of dollars to get the bottom of the REAL problem. The REAL problem being those who developed, built and signed off for delivery a half completed project. The military spends more money on trying to destroy one of their own than they do on fixing what truly is broken... The system.
To the sailor who lost his life and to his family.... I salute you and thank you all for the ultimate price you have all paid. On behalf of all Americans, I thank you for the ultimate sacrifice your son and your family have paid for the Freedom afforded each and every one of us!!!
Navy
I'll get bashed for this, but I'll say it anyway as it is true. I know little about this officer or this ship, but I did get to see a Navy demonstration aboard one of the older amphibs in the recent past, including a launch of their brand new RHIB. I have to tell you - Navy training on weapons and small boat launching was not impressive. Their close in weapons (Bushmaster 25mm, M@ .50cal and M242 7.62 machine guns) malfunctioned at an alarming rate, showed rust, and clearly were not maintained. They smashed their new RHIB on launch and no one seemed to care. It took them well over a minute once aboard to get under way. I was embarassed for them and the obvious lack of training they received. This in no way is an attack on those sailors - but they clearly were not receiving the proper training; whether that was the result of lack of time/overburden, lack of funding, lack of training of the leaders (train to train), or lack of leadership, I don't know.
And as a follow-up
I would add that the "Revolution In Training" undertaken by the Navy has done that organization no favors. The Services undertook a "streamlining" of training more than a decade ago that amounted to eliminating mature training structures that had evolved and over a very long period of time and replacing it with ad hoc training structures that emphasise such concepts as comnputer-based simulations the speed through which a student can be processed through a particular class.
To be fair, the Navy faced tough choices centered around a high OPTEMPO and declining budgets. Something had to go, and contact hours between subject-matter experts and trainees were viewed as expensive, and ultimately irresistible targets.
Trainers have been howling about this for years, always finishing their complaints that "it's going to take someone getting killed to change this". I don't know if that's the case here, but hopefully something can be changed to prevent further occurances.